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1. In this section we follow
Darvas (2011c) in cate-
gorising ten important
issues – the first four relate
to pre-crisis developments,
while the other six relate to
issues highlighted by the
crisis.
2. The exact definition
allows a small discrepancy
from the three percent
deficit benchmark in certain
cases, and the debt may be
greater than 60 percent of
GDP if it “is sufficiently
diminishing and approach-
ing the reference value at a
satisfactory pace”. To calcu-
late the number of viola-
tions of these criteria in
Darvas (2010b), we used
the three percent bench-
mark for the deficit, and for
a debt above 60 percent,
we projected the average
change in the debt/GDP
ratio over the latest three
years 20 years ahead and
checked if it will lead to a
ratio below 60 percent. Note
that the six-pack reforms
adopted in 2011 opera-
tionalised this criterion the
same way: “the gap
between the debt level and
the 60 percent reference
should be reduced by at
least 1/20th annually (on
average over three years)”;
see European Commission
(2011).
1 INTRODUCTION
The euro faces an existential crisis. In the wake of
the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the euro seemed
to be a shelter for its members (Wyplosz, 2009),
but attitudes changed completely following the
series of events that began with the Greek fiscal
crisis in early 2010. Despite attempts by various
European institutions, the crisis continues and the
outlook is bleak. Why is it so difficult to resolve the
euro crisis?
The typical answers to this question are that the
euro area does not constitute an optimum cur-
rency area or that monetary unions were tradi-
tionally combined with fiscal and political unions.
These generalisations have some validity, but
given the status quo and the complexity of the
euro area’s legal and institutional arrangements,
they are not very helpful for providing solutions or
determining the fate of the euro.
In this Policy Contribution we summarise ten
major roots of the euro-crisis and assess the
policy responses (if any) to these issues. We
conclude that the most pressing problem, which
also constitutes the most serious threat to the
integrity of the euro area, is the dreary economic
outlook in southern euro-area member states. As
Figure 1 indicates, using data from IMF (2012),
southern European members of the euro area are
expected to fall behind the US in GDP per capita
terms quite dramatically in the years ahead.
Western and northern EU countries are also
expected to experience a relative decline. And the
IMF outlook must be interpreted as a baseline
scenario with the risks on the downside.
We also conclude that instead of exiting or break-
ing-up the euro, the common interest lies in dis-
covering ways in which these countries' prospects
can be improved. A great deal of homework needs
to be done by southern European countries, but
other euro-area partners and European institu-
tions will also have decisive roles to play in sup-
porting the process. In the medium term,
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Figure 1: GDP per capita in major geographical regions of the EU (USA = 100), 1950-2017
Source: Author’s calculations using data from IMF (2012), PENN World Tables and EBRD. Note: GDP is based on purchasing
power parity dollars; median values are indicated for the groups, which are as follows: West: Austria, Belgium, France, Ger-
many, and the Netherlands; South: Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain; North: Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Ireland, and the UK;
Central: the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia; East: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, and Romania.
additional institutional changes will be necessary
to complement the currently planned overhaul of
the euro-area’s institutional framework.
2 TEN MAJOR REASONS BEHIND THE EURO-
AREA CRISIS AND THE EU’S RESPONSES1
2.1 The failure of the Stability and Growth Pact
The rules-based Stability and Growth Pact (SGP),
which was the cornerstone of fiscal prudence in
the EU, failed. In Darvas (2010b), we calculated
the number of violations of the euro-entry criteria,
which also include the SGP's two fiscal criteria: the
three percent of GDP budget deficit criterion and
the 60 percent of GDP government debt criterion2.
We found that between 2001 and 2006, ie after
the euro was introduced but before the global
financial crisis erupted in 2007, approximately
one-third of euro-area member states violated the
SGP. Such violations greatly diminished the trust
in the effectiveness of EU rules-based surveil-
lance and resulted in high public debt, especially
in Greece and Italy, at the start of the crisis.
A number of new agreements have been reached
to strengthen the SGP3. These new agreements
fundamentally reform fiscal coordination, surveil-
lance and enforcement in the EU, and in particu-
lar, in the euro area. Fiscal rules will be stronger,
will be enshrined in national constitutions, and
non-compliance will be sanctioned in a quasi-
automatic way. If properly implemented, these
agreements could help to sustain healthy fiscal
positions once the current crisis is solved. How-
ever, they are less helpful in resolving the current
fiscal crisis in the euro area. Although the so-called
structural budget balance (ie the budget balance
excluding the impact of the economic cycle and
one-time expenditures and revenue measures)
will receive greater emphasis, current debates
almost exclusively focus on the three percent
nominal deficit target. This leads to a strong con-
tractionary bias, ie pro-cyclical fiscal policy during
the current downturn. Moreover, the current situa-
tion could only be made worse by, for example,
forcing Greece or Spain to pay an immediate fine
for not fulfilling the earlier nominal deficit targets4.
An alternative solution, a form of Eurobonds (ie
pooled national bond issuances), is unfortunately
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not yet on the table, partly due to the mistrust
between euro-area nations, and partly due to the
very complex institutional framework that would
be required to make the common bond issuance
function properly, in the absence of an adequate
level of political and fiscal integration. The pro-
posal by Delpla and von Weizsäcker (2010) of
splitting debt issuances into a senior component
of up to 60 percent of a member state’s GDP (‘Blue
bonds’, guaranteed by all participating countries)
and a junior component above the 60 percent
threshold (‘Red bonds’, guaranteed by the issuing
country alone), would stabilise government
financing (via the Blue bonds) but would expose
governments to market discipline (via the Red
bonds)5.
2.2 Neglect of private-sector vulnerabilities
Pre crisis, there was a sole focus on fiscal issues
– and a consequent neglect of private-sector
behaviour. This resulted in unsustainable credit
and housing booms in countries such as Ireland
and Spain6 and the emergence of structural
imbalances such as high current-account deficits
(Figure 2) and eroded competitiveness. 
Divergence within a monetary union, such as
divergence in current account balances, is not
necessarily a bad thing. Capital flows across
regions and the ensuing current account deficits
Zsolt Darvas  THE EURO CRISIS: TEN ROOTS, BUT FEWER SOLUTIONS
3. These are the following:
the so-called ‘six-pack’ (five
regulations and one direc-
tive approved by all 27
Member States and the
European Parliament in
October 2010), the ‘Euro
Plus Pact’ (signed by 23
countries in March 2011),
the ‘Fiscal Compact’ (Treaty
on Stability, Coordination
and Governance in the EMU,
signed by 25 countries in
March 2012). Furthermore,
a new proposal called the
‘two-pack’ drafted by the
European Commission in
November 2011 is currently
under negotiation. See
Marzinotto and Sapir
(2012) for an assessment
of the new fiscal framework.
4. Marzinotto and Sapir
(2012) also argue that
since the new fiscal frame-
work was introduced in a
situation in which several
euro-area countries were
under an excessive deficit
procedure and the growth
prospect of most of them is
weak, fiscal surveillance
should be prioritised over
the enforcement of sanc-
tions for excessive deficits.
5. Blue bonds should be
phased in through complete
pooling of new issuances,
in which a member state
can participate until its
share of the stock of
Eurobonds reaches 60 per-
cent of its GDP (Darvas,
2011b). Such a phasing-in
would give struggling coun-
tries a long period to put
their fiscal houses in order,
while benefiting from a low
interest rate.
6. See for example Ahearne,
Delgado and von
Weizsäcker (2008).
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Figure 2: Current account balances in main EU
geographical groups (% of GDP), 1995-2017
Source: Author’s calculations using data from IMF (2012)
data. Note: median values are indicated for the groups
defined in the note to Figure 1.
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7. The difference between
the adjustment patterns of
eastern and southern Euro-
pean countries is striking.
While private capital inflows
halted and even reversed in
both regions, in southern
Europe banks received
massive liquidity support
from the ECB, which has
offset the sudden stop in
private capital flows. Such
support has contributed to
financial stability, but at the
same time, it made it possi-
ble for these countries to
delay the adjustment, as
noted by Sinn (2011).
8. Note that Italy differs
from Greece, Spain and Por-
tugal, in that its current
account balance remained
between +/- three percent
between 1982 and 2009,
and its net IIP is projected to
deteriorate from -21 per-
cent of GDP in 2011 to -28
percent of GDP by 2017. For
Greece, Spain and Portugal
net IIP is projected to deteri-
orate below -100 percent of
GDP during the years ahead.
9. The ‘six-pack’ and the
‘Euro Plus Pact’ included
such measures; see foot-
note 3.
10. See European Commis-
sion (2012b).
11. Ruscher and Wolff
(2012) argue that there
was a long process of bal-
ance sheet adjustment of
non-financial corporations
in Germany starting in the
mid-1990s, and such bal-
ance sheet adjustment
used to lead to wage moder-
ation. Changes in labour
laws and a social consen-
sus may have also con-
tributed to wage moderation
in Germany. See Darvas
(2012a) for the analysis of
competitiveness changes
of euro-area member
states, including Germany.
and surpluses may reflect the improved utilisation
of resources when capital moves to fast-growing
regions to the benefit of the entire monetary
union. However, the booms and busts in the Irish
and Spanish housing sectors (see Ahearne,
Delgado and von Weizsäcker, 2008) exemplify
capital misallocation. Additionally the
accumulation of ‘excessive’ regional debt is
undesirable, and there are good reasons to
conclude that the external debt of Greece, Portugal
and Spain became excessive (Darvas, 2012b). 
Looking ahead, the external debt position is even
expected to worsen in southern European
countries (Figure 3). The further improvements in
the current account balances of southern
members7, as projected by the IMF (2012), along
with GDP projections, would even imply an
additional increase in net external debt8.
The EU’s response to the recognition that not only
fiscal issues matter includes measures to prevent
and correct private sector imbalances, such as
weak competitiveness positions and high private
debt9. A new procedure, the so called Macroeco-
nomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP), has been intro-
duced with the aim of assessing these private
sector vulnerabilities and assisting countries in
designing remedies10. Undoubtedly, this proce-
dure is a major innovation in the EU’s economic
governance framework. However, its effectiveness
needs to be tested, and in any case adjustment
within the euro area could take a long time.
2.3 Lack of effective tools to foster structural
adjustment
Even when it was recognised that certain private
sector developments can lead to vulnerabilities,
there were no proper mechanisms to foster
structural adjustment. Structural adjustment has
two main and interrelated aspects:
microeconomic, such as regulations and policies
that effect the business climate, flexibility of
markets, banking activities, innovation and the
educational system of the country, and
macroeconomic, which is primarily reflected in
aggregate productivity changes, price and wage
competitiveness and external balances.
Some countries, such as Germany, were able to
adjust within the euro area, ie Germany’s
competitiveness improved considerably from the
mid-1990’s until the onset of the crisis, and its
current account deficit became a sizeable
surplus11. But others, such as Greece, Italy, Spain
and Portugal, were not able to adjust. While
Germany, Italy and Portugal had the worst growth
performances of euro-area member states before
the crisis, Germany boosted its competitiveness
during this period, but Italy and Portugal did not.
Booming domestic demand contributed to rapid
economic growth in Spain and Greece before the
crisis, which obscured the more serious structural
problems.
Following IMF (2010) and Allard and Evaraert
(2010), in Darvas and Pisani-Ferry (2011) we
studied aspects of growth that could be improved
through structural reforms, namely labour market
inefficiency, business regulation, network regula-
tion, retail sector regulation, professional services
regulation, institutions and contracts, human cap-
ital, infrastructure and innovation. We found that
southern European countries are severely lagging
behind on almost all criteria.
Fostering structural adjustment is one of the aims
of the MIP. The European Semester, a yearly cycle
THE EURO CRISIS: TEN ROOTS, BUT FEWER SOLUTIONS Zsolt Darvas
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Figure 3: Net international investment position
in main EU geographical groups (% of GDP),
1998-2017
Source: Eurostat up to 2011. For 2012-2017 we used IMF
(2012) projections for nominal GDP and current account bal-
ance and assumed that the change in the nominal value of
the net IIP equals the current account balance. Note: median
values are shown for the country groups defined in the note
to Figure 1.
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and Portugal were granted financial assistance
from these funds, as was Greece in a second pro-
gramme, with IMF co-funding in each case. The
scope of these facilities was widened to fund pro-
grammes related to banking only (Spain
requested and granted such a programme in early
summer 2012) and to purchase government
securities on the secondary markets (which has
not so far happened). The European Stability
Mechanism (ESM)15, a permanent rescue fund
with €500 billion in resources, was inaugurated
on 8 October 201216. These facilities are adequate
for smaller countries and perhaps Spain, but the
resources, even if augmented by IMF lending,
would not be sufficient if Italy were to require
assistance, unless the ECB steps in with massive
amounts of government-bond purchases. 
The set-up of these financing facilities is justified
by the current euro-area situation, but in the
medium term it would be preferable to design an
institutional framework in which member states
do not have to lend money to each other. Such a
system could be built on the basis of Blue and Red
bonds (section 2.1) with a strict no bail-out rule
for sovereigns, a banking union and a limited
centralised fiscal capacity to help smooth out
economic cycles (we discuss the latter two
elements in the next sections). 
2.5 Interdependence of banks and sovereigns
National bank resolution regimes and the home-
country bias in banks’ government-bond holdings
imply that there is a lethal correlation between
banking and sovereign debt crises. When a
government gets into trouble, so does the
country's banking system (eg Greece), and vice
versa (eg Ireland). Merler and Pisani-Ferry (2012)
demonstrated that most continental euro-area
countries were characterised by the large size of
their banks’ portfolios of domestic government
bonds, which were markedly larger than in the
United Kingdom or the US. Moreover, during the
crisis this vulnerability has increased, as all
countries about which concerns about state
solvency arose have seen a reversal in the
previously steady increase of the share of
government debt held by non-residents. Germany,
by contrast, has seen an increase in the share
held by non-residents.
of mutual assessment of fiscal and structural
issues was introduced in 2010. It encompasses
all new instruments, including the MIP, and is
undoubtedly useful, though the jury is still out on
its effectiveness. Marzinotto, Wolff and Hallerberg
(2011) concluded that member states are only
slowly internalising the new procedure and the
European Semester so far lacks legitimacy due to
the minor role assigned to the European
Parliament, the marginal involvement of national
parliaments and the lack of transparency at some
stages of the process.
2.4 Lack of a crisis-resolution mechanism
There was no crisis-resolution mechanism for
euro-area countries. The series of sovereign debt
crises in the euro area came as a surprise and
euro-area policymakers had to improvise. It is
important to highlight that in other federations,
such as the US, there are no crisis-resolution
mechanisms for sub-central governments either
(Darvas, 2010a). When studying the conditions
required for a fiscal union to function smoothly
and successfully, Bordo, Markiewicz and Jonung
(2011) concluded: “the first and probably the
most important condition is a credible
commitment to a no‐bailout rule.” In the euro-area,
the reluctance of citizens of economically stronger
countries such as Germany, the Netherlands and
Finland, to extend loans to economically weaker
countries, such as Greece, highlight the validity of
this conclusion. However, it also must be
recognised that public debt levels in certain euro-
area member states are much higher than
sub-central government debt in other federations,
and for the reasons discussed in the next two
sections, an uncontrolled government default
could be more harmful for the rest of the euro area
than a similar default of a sub-central government
would be in other federations12.
The lack of a sovereign debt crisis resolution
mechanism was initially addressed through some
temporary arrangements: bilateral lending from
euro-area partners (in partnership with the IMF)
to Greece in May 2010, and the establishment of
two temporary financing mechanisms, the EFSF
(European Financial Stability Facility)13 and the
EFSM (European Financial Stability Mechanism)14,
with a combined firepower of €500 billion. Ireland
12. This conclusion remains
valid even though a prop-
erly designed debt restruc-
turing inside the euro area
should not cause a major
contagion, as we argued in
Darvas (2011a), and as the
subsequent Greek experi-
ence has shown.
13. See
http://www.efsf.europa.eu/a
bout/index.htm
14. See
http://ec.europa.eu/econ-
omy_finance/eu_borrower/ef
sm/index_en.htm
15. See European Council
(2012a).
16. See Bijlsma and Vallée
(2012) for an assessement
of these facilities.
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2.6 Interdependence of countries
The interdependence of countries is much
stronger than was generally perceived during the
good years before the crisis. Government and
private sector defaults in a small country can lead
to contagion, while the default of a large country
would lead to meltdown. Italy, for example, cannot
be allowed to go bankrupt, as it would bankrupt
the Italian banking system, which in turn would
cause a meltdown in the rest of the euro-area
banking system and would also have disruptive
effects outside the euro area. This channel would
remain important even if financial integration were
to be reversed to a significant extent, as argued by
the ECB (2012a).
The strong interdependence of countries should
primarily be addressed by limiting the scope of
the fiscal and private sector vulnerabilities of
member states in three main areas: (a) structural,
(b) banking, and (c) public finances. The European
Semester – to the extent that it proves to be effec-
tive – could help address structural vulnerabili-
ties. Banking interdependence could be best
addressed with a properly designed banking
union, as discussed above. Fiscal vulnerabilities
are supposed to be kept under control by the EU's
revised fiscal architecture, yet a type of Eurobond,
such as the previously discussed Blue bond,
would further help to limit the spread of a sover-
eign debt crisis from one country to another.
2.7 Lack of a lender of last resort for sovereigns
The strict prohibition of ECB/Eurosystem
monetary financing means that euro-area
governments borrow as if they were borrowing in
a foreign currency, as highlighted by De Grauwe
(2011). This is because a central bank can in
principle act as a lender of last resort for the
sovereign, ie print money and buy government
bonds (as the Federal Reserve, the Bank of
England and the Bank of Japan did during the
crisis). The lack of a lender of last resort for
sovereigns of individual states of a monetary
‘In the medium term it would be preferable to design an institutional framework based on Blue
and Red bonds with a strict no bail-out rule for sovereigns, a banking union and a limited
centralised fiscal capacity to help smooth out economic cycles.’
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The lethal correlation between banking and
sovereign debt crises could be best addressed
with a so called ‘banking federation’ or ‘banking
union’, whereby bank resolution and deposit
guarantees would be centralised at the euro-area
(or preferably the EU) level, which would also
require the centralisation of regulation and
supervision, and a fiscal backstop for the
centralised resolution and deposit guarantee
system. This is because when bank resolution in a
given country is not the responsibility of that
country’s government, but bank recapitalisation,
when needed, would be financed using a common
fund, then banking fragility would not lead directly
to sovereign debt problems for that government.
The opposite case, in which the fragility of the
government is transmitted to the banks of a given
country, could also be better managed when
regulation and supervision are centralised at the
euro-area level.
The notion of a banking union was not on the
agenda until late spring 2012, despite numerous
calls by economists (see eg Véron, 2011). How-
ever, the intensification of the euro-crisis brought
euro-area policymakers back to reality, and per-
haps the call for a banking union seemed a politi-
cally more acceptable alternative compared to the
issuance of Eurobonds and a more rapid move
towards a full-fledged fiscal union. Consequently,
the European Council on 28-29 June 2012 called
for a banking union and the European Commission
proposed its first element, a single supervisory
mechanism for banks on 12 September 2012. It
was agreed that once banks come under the con-
trol of the joint supervisor, the ESM would be able
to recapitalise banks directly. The willingness of
member states to relinquish national sovereignty
over major banking issues is clearly an important
development in crisis management. Yet the for-
mation of the banking union will be extremely
complex, and many open issues need to be nego-
tiated and agreed, as discussed by Pisani-Ferry et
al (2012). These include the means of providing
financing for the banking union, which is studied
by Pisani-Ferry and Wolff (2012).
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17. See ECB (2010) and ECB
(2012b).
18. In Darvas (2012c) we
assessed the various
criticisms of the OMT and
concluded that they are
largely unjustified.
union is not a substantial problem when the level
of debt is low. For example, in the US, the Federal
Reserve does not buy the debt of states such as
California or New York, but buys only federal
bonds. Although California has been in deep
financial trouble since 2007, its eventual default
would not cause a major disruption to the US
banking system: the State of California's debt is
small, approximately 7 percent of California’s GDP
(the debt of local governments in California
represents an additional 13 percent of the state’s
GDP); moreover, this debt is not held by banks, but
mainly by individuals. However an Italian default
would be a game changer for Europe. 
The lack of a lender of last resort for sovereigns
could be remedied by establishing a stronger
political and fiscal union that could provide the
basis for changing the ECB's statutes. Without
such a change, the ECB must act within its current
mandate. On the secondary markets, the ECB has
already purchased the sovereign bonds of
member states under the so-called Securities
Market Programme (SMP), which began in May
2010 and was terminated on 6 September 2012,
replaced by the Outright Monetary Transactions
(OMT) programme17.
The SMP had only temporary effects on
government bond yields for a number of reasons,
but the OMT differs from the SMP in several
respects. It will be in principle unlimited, the ECB
will not claim senior creditor status with respect
to other bondholders, and the major condition for
OMT has been clarified, ie compliance with a full or
a precautionary macroeconomic adjustment
programme by the EFSF or the ESM.
The initial reactions of the markets (up to the time
of writing) to the OMT were positive. For example,
the 2-year Spanish government bond yield fell
from a 15-year record high of 6.9 percent in late
July 2012 to below 3 percent in early September
2012. Longer maturity yields have also fallen
somewhat. 
It was wise for the ECB to introduce the OMT, as
otherwise the euro-crisis may have escalated in
mid-201218. By preventing a self-fulfilling crisis,
the OMT may help to reduce government bond
yields, and thereby also lower private sector
yields, which will help the economy. However, the
OMT operations can only buy precious time, but
cannot solve the euro crisis and cannot fully
eliminate the risk of an eventual euro-area exit, as
these would be dependent on the answers given
to the other more fundamental problems of the
euro area, in particular the growth question that
we discuss next. 
2.8 Downward spiral and negative feedback
between the crisis and growth
There is a downward spiral in the adjusting
countries of southern Europe, where fiscal
accounts are extremely hard-pressed, ie fiscal
adjustment is leading to a weaker economy,
thereby reducing public revenues and creating
additional fiscal adjustment needs. It is extremely
difficult to break this vicious circle in the absence
of a stand-alone currency. In the US, automatic
stabilisers, such as unemployment insurance, are
operated by the federal government, which also
invests more in distressed states – but in Europe
such instruments do not exist. An economic
stabilisation tool is badly needed for the euro area,
which should work as automatically as possible
and ideally be financed from a euro-area wide tax.
It should be confined to economic stabilisation
only, and not be a platform for permanent
transfers between euro-area member states.
There is also a negative feedback loop between
the crisis and growth in economically stronger
euro-area countries. In addition to the direct
impact of crisis in southern euro members through
trade and financial links, uncertainty over the
future of the euro means that corporations and
households are more hesitant to invest and
consume in the economically stronger countries
as well. Furthermore, funding constraints in the
banking sector, increasing credit risks for banks
because of the weakening economic outlook, and
the efforts to raise banks’ capital ratios are leading
to a reduction in credit supply throughout the euro
area, further dampening economic growth.
Without effective solutions to address the crisis,
growth is unlikely to resume.
The EU did not have a powerful response to the
growth crisis. The main goals of the ‘Compact for
Growth and Jobs’ agreed to at the 29 June 2012
Zsolt Darvas  THE EURO CRISIS: TEN ROOTS, BUT FEWER SOLUTIONS
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summit19, such as structural reforms, completing
the restructuring of the banking sector, growth-
friendly fiscal consolidations, addressing the
social consequences of the crisis and deepening
the single market, are all correct. However, few
new tools were mobilised to achieve these goals.
Providing fresh capital to the European Investment
Bank (EIB) (€10 billion, which would increase
lending capacity by €60 billion) and launching a
pilot phase for Project Bonds up to €4.5 billion are
welcome, but these would have a limited impact
on growth in the EU. Moreover, while mobilising
idle Structural Funds (also agreed at the summit)
is also crucial, it does not constitute new funding
and progresses very slowly.
2.9 Lack of a euro-area fiscal policy
No institution is responsible for managing the
overall fiscal stance of the euro area. Member
states implement the policy deemed appropriate
for their own economies, subject to the constraints
of the European fiscal governance framework.
However, the aggregate of such decentralised
fiscal policy is unlikely to produce optimal fiscal
policy for the euro area as a whole. For example,
while the aggregate fiscal position of the euro area
is much better than that of the US (Figure 4), and
while the economic outlook is arguably more
fragile in the euro area, there is a much stronger
consolidation bias in the euro area as a whole than
in the US. Certainly, states in the US are also
independent in setting state-level fiscal policies
(all but one has a balanced-budget constitutional
rule), and “a degree of revenue and expenditure
independence of the members of the fiscal union
reflecting their preferences” is arguably necessary
for a fiscal union to function successfully (Bordo,
Markewicz and Jonung, 2011). However in the US
the federal government dispenses more than half
of total tax revenues and considers the US
economy as a whole when setting fiscal policy
targets (Darvas, 2010a). In other federations,
such as Canada or Switzerland, the circumstances
are similar.
The euro area has not yet reached a point where a
discussion can be begun on the overall fiscal
stance of the euro area and the way it could be
aligned to the situation of the euro area as a whole.
2.10 Executive and democratic deficit
The crisis is not just a sovereign debt, banking and
growth crisis, but also a governance crisis. In most
cases the response of European policymakers has
been partial, inadequate and belated,
undermining their credability to resolve the crisis.
Some observers have concluded that agreeing a
comprehensive solution is technically and
politically out of reach. Compounded with the lack
of democratic accountability of various European
decision-making bodies, Véron (2012) places the
“executive and democratic deficit” at the centre of
19. See European Council
(2012b).
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the lingering euro crisis and argues that some of
the most important problems, such as Europe’s
banking crisis, the Greek sovereign debt saga, and
the weak growth outlook of southern European
member states, could have been addressed
earlier and in a decisive way had proper European
decision-making processes existed. Overcoming
executive and democratic deficiencies is a truly
fundamental issue, yet because of political
constraints, any progress will be, at best,
piecemeal. 
3 SOUTHERN EUROPE AND THE EURO’S FUTURE
The combined impact of the ‘ten roots’ is to
depress the economic outlook in the euro area,
and in particular, in southern Europe (Figure 1).
There is a view that southern euro members have
no hope for growth inside the euro area and an exit
from the euro is their only viable option. While
undoubtedly it would be much easier for southern
euro members to solve their problems outside the
euro area, I disagree on both counts: there is some
hope, at least in some southern members, and an
exit would likely be so disastrous that it would
take a very long time to recoup the output that
would be lost during the exit process. An exit
would cause devastating consequences for
economically stronger countries as well,
fundamentally threatening the euro, with severe
implications for the whole EU.
• Hope: Since 2008, Spanish exporters have
been the best performers among the EU15
countries, ie the pre-2004 members of the EU
(Darvas, 2012a). Spain is followed by
Germany, Ireland and Portugal. Spain and
Portugal even outperform the UK and Sweden,
two countries that benefited from significant
currency depreciation during the crisis20. While
the Portuguese and Spanish tradable sectors
remain small, solid export performance is an
indication that the tradable sector has scope for
expansion. Additionally, the World Bank (2012)
found that large and internationalised firms in
southern Europe are as productive as large
firms in western and northern Europe, and the
main issue is that there are far fewer large firms
in southern Europe, because of various
barriers. Altomonte, Aquilante and Ottaviano
(2012) arrived at a similar conclusion. This
suggests that while the business conditions
are unfavourable and there are barriers to firm
growth, properly managed firms are able to
achieve a high level of efficiency even in
southern Europe.
• Disastrous exit: It is impossible to provide an
accurate estimate of the cost of an exit from the
euro, but it would most likely be huge. UBS
(2012) have concluded that an economically
weak country leaving the euro area would lose
approximately one half of its GDP in the first
year. If they are correct, it is unclear how many
years it would take to compensate for the lost
output, even if growth were to increase from
this halved level of output. The huge decline in
output would necessitate even harsher fiscal
austerity, as it is not very likely that, in the
event of a messy exit from the euro, other euro-
area partners would be happy to lend to the
departing country. Without such support, the
government could spend only tax revenues,
which would be dramatically reduced by the
collapse in GDP and a likely increase in tax
evasion. Moreover, there would be longer-term
consequences. The low credibility of the newly
stand-alone central bank of the exiting country
would likely lead to much higher real interest
rates and a period of high inflation, which are
bad for growth. Additionally, a euro exit may be
accompanied by an EU exit, depriving the
country of transfers from the EU. It is also in the
best interest of euro-area partners to keep
these countries in the union, and not just
because of the direct losses that would arise
from financial and trade relationships with the
exiting country. Even more importantly, in the
case of an exit, it would be very difficult to
safeguard other economically weaker
countries and a wave of exits would be even
more disastrous for the economically stronger
euro-area countries21.
Notwithstanding positive export performance in
some countries, and the fear of disaster which
provides the incentive to find solutions, the deep
economic slump in southern countries will not end
any time soon. If the recession continues to
deepen, social tensions could escalate, which
may lead to domestic political paralysis. Under
20. However, the export per-
formance of Greece is very
weak.
21. And the euro is not just
about economics but has
major historical and political
roots as well.
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such circumstances, cooperation between euro-
area partners and the country in question,
including financial assistance that has already
been granted to some southern euro members,
could come to an end, leading to an accelerated
and possibly uncontrolled exit from the euro area,
with all the consequences we described above.
Therefore, the single most pressing threat to the
integrity, and perhaps also the existence, of the
euro is the depth of the recession in southern
European member states and their bleak
economic outlook. 
Solid economic growth in southern Europe would
help to ameliorate many other aspects of the euro
crisis. It would gradually help to improve the
employment situation and ease social tensions.
It would help to improve public finances, thereby
reducing the need for fiscal consolidation. It would
help to stabilise asset prices, and in particular,
housing prices, which in turn would improve bank
balance sheets, thereby also reducing
recapitalisation needs. Increased trust in banks
and the hope of an economic recovery would slow
or even reverse capital outflows from these
counties. As a consequence, economic growth in
southern Europe would greatly diminish the exit
risk that some southern euro-members face. 
But economic growth in southern Europe would
also reduce the political risk in creditor countries.
Because of domestic political developments, a
creditor country may unilaterally decide to stop
granting further loans to southern European
countries (Darvas, 2011a) and instead decide to
leave the euro area. That may start a chain
reaction with other economically stronger
countries following. Economic growth in southern
Europe would reduce the need for bailouts,
thereby reducing this external political risk.
Without the problems of the economically weaker
southern countries (for which economically
stronger members also bear responsibility22),
economically stronger euro-area members would
be able to overcome their banking difficulties, and
the other issues we identified as the roots of the
euro crisis would be much less pressing. 
A number of actions could be taken to improve the
economic prospects for southern euro members:
• The southern euro-countries should engage in
a number of efforts: we have highlighted that
they suffer from vast structural weaknesses,
which are impediments to growth. Moreover,
while productivity has improved and unit labour
costs have fallen, for example in Spain since
2008, this was mainly the consequence of
reduced employment, which has adverse
social consequences. Wages proved to be
downwardly rigid (Darvas, 2012a)23. Structural
reform to improve the functioning of labour
markets is also inevitable, as are reforms to
intensify competition in the non-tradable
sector, which should increase productivity and
reduce prices. However, it will take a long time
for these reforms to take effect.
• The southern euro-countries should also
continue fiscal consolidation at an appropriate
pace, but the structural deficit criterion, which
is central to the euro area's new fiscal
framework (see section 2.1), should finally
receive full attention. When fiscal targets are
not met due to weakened economic
performance, responding with additional
austerity measures just deepens the recession
(see section 2.8)24. Instead of the setting of
nominal fiscal targets, such as the critical three
percent of GDP deficit target, the debates and
the deadlines should refer to the structural
deficit.
• There is a strong case for calling for unit labour
cost (ULC) increases in economically stronger
euro-area trading partners (see for example
Wolff, 2012; and Merler and Pisani-Ferry,
2012). To some extent wage growth has
accelerated in Germany, but in any case this
process will take a long time25.
22. The economically
stronger are responsible for
designing an improper insti-
tutional framework for the
euro area, for letting certain
southern countries join
though they did not meet
entry criteria (Darvas,
2010b), for being the first to
flout the SGP rules in the
early 2000s (France and
Germany), for not being
forceful in preventing pre-
crisis developments that
resulted in southern euro
members’ major vulnerabili-
ties, and for ineffectively
addressing the escalating
euro-crisis from 2010.
23. Eventual wage decline in
southern Europe would
improve the competitive-
ness of companies, but
would worsen debt sustain-
ability and reduce domestic
demand. Therefore, foster-
ing downward wage adjust-
ment should be just one
element of the policy mix
and should be supple-
mented with the other
polices we list.
24. Unfortunately, the deep
recession that southern
euro members are facing
has not been very instru-
mental in lowering prices
and wages, thereby increas-
ing the competitiveness of
those economies. While
structural reforms may
increase the responsive-
ness of prices and wages to
the business cycle, as
argued by Merler and Pisani-
Ferry (2012), further fiscal
consolidation does not
seem to be the best tool to
address the southern com-
petitiveness problems.
25. Higher average inflation
in the euro area as a whole
would also help to correct
pre-crisis intra-euro diver-
gences in prices and wages,
but such a policy would be
clearly unacceptable to the
economically stronger
countries of the euro area.
‘The single most pressing threat to the integrity, and perhaps also to the existence, of the
euro is the depth of the recession in southern European member states, and their bleak
economic outlook.’
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• Fiscal expansion in economically stronger
euro-area members, or at least a significant
slowdown in the pace of fiscal consolidation,
would facilitate the economic adjustment of the
southern members (Merler and Pisani-Ferry,
2012). Unfortunately, however, the relaxation
of fiscal targets in stronger countries does not
seem to be on the agenda.
• A weaker euro would also greatly facilitate
adjustment in southern euro-area members
(Darvas, 2012b). It could be fostered by further
interest rate cuts and quantitative easing by
the ECB. A weaker euro would help southern
economies to improve their trade balances with
non-euro countries and would also boost
German exports. This in turn would help to
address intra-euro imbalances, since increased
exports would likely translate into greater wage
increases in Germany, because of its tight
labour market, but not in Spain, because of its
high unemployment. Thus, Spain’s competi-
tiveness relative to Germany would also
improve. Without a weaker euro, Spain would
need to enter a deflationary period, which is dif-
ficult to achieve and would worsen both the
public and private debt situation even more.
• Bad assets in the banking system should be
recognised and dealt with promptly, to support
both deleveraging in the non-financial private
sector and the restoration of credit provision,
as argued by Aherne and Wolff (2012).
• Euro-area partners should also recognise that
public debt, at least in Greece, is still too high.
Even if the austerity programme is
implemented as planned, it is very unlikely that
Greece will be able to repay all of its public debt.
Prolonging the recognition of this issue simply
prolongs the uncertainty about Greece’s future,
thereby also negatively impacting the
economy. However, as European partners have
loaned money to Greece to repay private
lenders and therefore have ‘socialised’ a large
share of Greek public debt, further significant
public debt reduction cannot be accomplished
without some involvement by the official
sector. This is the price that euro-area partners
have to pay for their mistakes in managing the
Greek crisis in 2010 and 2011.
• Finally, to help break out of the downward
economic spiral that southern euro-area
member states face, a very significant
European investment programme is needed for
southern members. The EIB seems to be the
best institution to carry out such an investment
programme, and therefore further capital
should be provided to the EIB beyond the €10
billion agreed at the 29 June 2012 European
Council. Note that investments are different
from aid and lending.
4 CONCLUDING REMARKS
The euro has many flaws, which were cast into
stark relief during the crisis. For some of these
flaws, solutions have been provided, even if
belatedly, and member states have shown a
willingness to improve the functioning of the euro
area by agreeing to relinquish national
sovereignty in some important respects. However,
the single most pressing issue, which threatens
the integrity and perhaps the existence of the
euro, has not yet been well addressed: the
deepening economic contraction in southern
member states. Most of the major policy
measures that would help to stop the economic
misery in these countries and offer the prospect
for improved economic conditions are not yet on
the agenda. In the absence of the implementation
of these measures, there are very serious risks in
the economic and political developments taking
place in southern member states. While some
progress has been made in tackling some of the
roots of the crisis, there is still a long way to go to
address all of them fully.
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